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FINANCIAL SITUATION OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES 
Summary and main points in brief 
In 1993 in general, the peiformance of European industrial enter-
prises was back at its I 984 level, wiping out the gains registered 
between 1984 and 1992. They were unable to improve their finan-
cial structures any further and remained extremely sensitive to 
variations in interest rates, particularly short-term rates. Small 
and medium-sized enterprises ( SMEs) seem to have coped better 
with the effects of the deterioration in the economy than large en-
terprises. 
In 1993, US enterprises, being in a more advanced phase of the 
economic cycle and taking advantage of particularly low short-
term interest rates, markedly outperformed their European and 
Japanese counterparts. 
In 1995, the profitability of European enterprises, especially the 
large groups, should benefit from the improvement in economic 
activity. Financing increased activity and rapidly growing invest-
ment does, however, raise the question of European enterprises' 
ability to self-finance against a background of high real interest 
rates. 
A. Europe, United States, Japan: contrasting trends 
In 1993, US enterprises generally outperformed their 
European and Japanese counterparts. As a result of the 
economic recovery which began in 1992, there was a dis-
tinct improvement in gross and net profit margins in the 
United States in 1993, with increases of 0.9 and 1.6 percen-
tage points respectively between 1992 and 1993. In Europe 
and Japan, however, they contracted further. The rebound 
in the financial profitability of US enterprises is spectacu-
lar (improving by a factor of 2.8 between 1992 and 1993); 
in Japan, financial profitability halved over the same 
period and in Europe the decline will probably be even 
more severe. 
The financial constraint is easing substantially in the 
United States: financial charges as a proportion of both 
turnover and gross profit almost halved between I992 and 
1993; the overall ratio of indebtedness is consistentlv 
lower than in Europe and Japan, and debt is more favour;,-
bly structured. As a result of the fall in interest rates, Japan-
ese enterprises are managing to contain financial charges 
as a proportion of their turnover and gross profit and to sta-
bilize their financial structures (slight improvement in the 
overall debt ratio and in the structure of debt). Converselv, 
the financial constraint is tightening on average in Europ~. 
The general increase in financial charges as a proportion 
of turnover and gross profit which was observed in 1992 
continued in 1993 in the countries for which data are avail-
able, the debt-shedding process has been halted and the 
improvement in the structure qf debt is marking time. 
B. Marked_ deterioration in the performance of European 
enterprises 
Between 1989 and 1993 the situation of European enter-
prises steadily deteriorated as industrial activity declined. 
In 1993, financial prqfitahility in European countries re-
ached the lowest levels recorded since 1985, with a verv 
sharp fall between 1992 and 1993. This situation partly e;-
plains investors' increasing tendency to steer clear of 
stock-exchange investments and take advantage of rising 
interest rates available on risk-free long-term invest-
ments. 
By contrast, between 1982 and 1989 European enterprises 
had improved their financial performance appreciably, in-
creasing their gross profit ratios (gross profit in relation to 
turnover) by 3.1 percentage points and their net profit ra-
tios (net profit in relation to turnover) by 3.6 percentage 
points. In 1989, financial profitability, which is of direct in-
terest to shareholders (net prqfit in relation to equity capi-
tal), thus significantly outstripped the return on risk-free 
long-term investments ( +4. 7 percentage points), promot-
ing financial .flows to enterprises. The strong convergence 
in the financial situation of European enterprises in 1989 
subsequently gave way to a more divergent trend. The maxi-
mum spread of financial profitability between Member 
States thus widened from 7.1 percentage points in 1989 to 
19.8 percentage points in 1992. The steady deterioration in 
the situation of manufacturing industry has therefore af-
fected Member States differently. 
C. Sh_arp rise in the financial charges of European enter-
prises 
Over the period from 1984 to 1993 the relative share ofpur-
chases of goods and services ( equivalent to some 63% of 
turnover) declined, mainly as a result c,f the fall in raw ma-
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terial prices (by 1 to 2 percentage points). Changes in the 
share of stqff costs (i.e. wages and social securitv contribu-
tions, around 22%) showed a rather uneven p;ttern over 
the period from 1982 to 1989, but increased steadilv be-
tween 1989 and 1993 with the progressive slowdown in in-
~ustrial ~ctivity. The gross profit realized by an enterprise 
zs what zs left after purchases of goods and services and 
staff costs have been covered; it represents some 11% to 
12% of turnover. In view of the tighter control of charges as 
a proportion of turnover, the recoverv in economic activitv 
should automatically be reflected in 1995 in an increase i~ 
the gross profit of European enterprises, unless the trend of 
raw material prices or wage claims becomes more unfa-
vourable. , 
Financial charges, which are the remuneration paid to 
lenders of capital ( 3.5% of turnover in 1992 ), are directlv 
influenced by the amount qf debt contracted by enterpris;s 
a~1d by the movement of interest rates. The burden of finan-
czal charges eased considerably between 1982 and 1988 
(from 3. 9% to 2.3%) but after 1988 increased again sharp-
ly, reaching in 1992 and 1993 levels comparable with those 
obtaining at the beginning of the 1980s. 
D. Debt stabilization 
Between 1989 and 1993 the slowdown in economic activitv 
~ed to a sharp fall in net profits, the source of self-finan~-
mg, and European enterprises managed to stabilize their 
debt ratios only as a result of the reduced need to finance 
investment. Previously, between 1982 and 1989 the overall 
ratio of indebtedness (share of debt in balance sheet) had 
.fallen steadily in Europe (from 63.2% to 56.6% ). From 
1995 the recovery in activity (forecast rise of3.8% in output 
and 9% i_n investment) will push up enterprises' funding 
needs. Wah real long-term interest rates expected to re-
main high (forecasts c~f 5. 7% in 1995 and 5.4% in 1996), en-
terprises are unlikely to change their preference for reduc-
ing debt. The question is therefore whether sel/-financing 
will he sufficient to fund tlze recovery? 
E. SMEs better equipped to cope with the recession than 
large enterprises 
SMEs have run up more debt than large enterprises since 
1988. Although they have generally recorded lower gross 
profit ratios than large enterprises, thev have been more 
successful in coping with the effects of tize deterioration in 
the economv than large enterprises; in 1992, for the first 
time, their gross profit ratio exceeded that of large e~ter-
pr~ses ( 11.3% for SM Es as against 11. 1% for large enter-
przses ). An analysis of net profit ratios confirms that large 
enterprises generally benefit more than SM Es from high-
growth years ( 1988 and 1989) but that their results are 
more sensitive to a decline in activity. 
By contrast, the financial profitability of SMEs is generally 
greater than that of large enterprises ( 1989 being the sole 
exceptio~1). The fznancial profitability gap in favour of 
SMEs wzdened to as much as 7. I percentage points in 1992, 
SMEs' position in niche markets working to their advan-
tage during times of recession. 
In 1992, with broadly the same debt ratios, the indebted-
n:ss of SM Es was more short-term, and they faced a con-
sistently higher apparent rate of interest over the period 
from 1984 to 1992. The sensitivity of SM Es to changes in in-
terest rates is therefore greater than that of large enter-
prises. 
INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturing industry has a relatively limited share 
(some 20% of GDP) in the economies of the EC 
Member States, the United States and Japan, even though 
industrial products are at the heart of those countries' trade. 
Being a sector that has been thrown wide open to interna-
tional competition, manufacturing industry is particularly 
sensitive to changes in the competitiveness of the econ-
omies under consideration. An increase in investment is 
contingent on enterprises' capacity to finance such invest-
ment, which is in turn linked to their profitability and finan-
cial structure. From the aggregated accounts of enterprises 
supplied by national bodies responsible for centralizing 
balance-sheet data, the European Commission has created 
a harmonized data bank - the BACH data bank- that pro-
Box I 
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vides access to the necessary financial statistics. Drawing 
on that data bank, this study sets out to compare the trends 
over the last ten years in the costs, profit or loss, and finan-
cial structures of industrial enterprises in the EC Member 
States, the United States and Japan. 
This supplement to European Economy provides, on the 
basis of financial information, an annual comparison of 
the profit or loss and financial structures of industrial 
enterprises in the EC Member States, the United States 
and Japan. This second issue looks in detail at changes 
in enterprises' performance (gross profit, net profit, finan-
cial profitability), their charges (purchases, staff costs, fi-
nancial charges) and their financial structure (overall debt 
ratio, structure of debt). The fourth section examines the 
situation of European small and medium-sized enterprises. 
BUSINESS ACCOUNTS HARMONIZED DATA BANK (BACH) 
As an accompaniment to its tools for economic analysis, 
the Commission of the European Communities (DG II) 
created in 1985 a data bank made up of the annual ac-
counts, aggregated at different sectoral levels, of sev-
eral EC countries, Japan and the United States. To 
that end, it contacted the national bodies responsible for 
centralizing balance-sheet data, which supplied it with 
aggregated sectoral information. The Commission de-
partments assumed that the samples used were represen-
tative since the data are generally published and ana-
lysed by those bodies. 
In order to allow comparative analyses to be made, the 
basic accounts were reworked for the purposes of 
harmonization according to a single accounting lay-
out consistent with the Fourth Directive. This pro-
duced time series of accounting data aggregated by sec-
tor and. in most cases, by size of enterprise, thus im-
proving the comparability of balance-sheet struc-
tures and profit and loss accounts between countries. 
Harmonization was at the centre of this project, with 
comparability the main objective, sometimes to the 
detriment of detail. However, the specific nature of 
national accounting methods, together with the diffi-
culty of compiling accounting documents a posteriori 
according to a common layout, restricted the degree of 
harmonization of the data in some respects. Consequent-
ly, although comparisons of trends are possible, com-
parisons of levels are trickier (and indeed impossible 
in some cases) and require a sound prior knowledge 
of each country's accounting and financial environ-
ment. DG II is a permanent associate member of the 
Cornite Europeen des Centrales de Bilans, which brings 
together national experts of the various bodies centraliz-
ing balance-sheet information that supply data to 
BACH. 
The sectoral nomenclature has also been standardized 
and comprises 22 sectors or subsectors. 
At present the data bank covers eleven countries: 
• Belgium (source: Banque Nationale de Belgique) 
• Germany (source: Deutsche Bundesbank) 
• Spain (source: Banco de Espana) 
• France (source: Banque de France) 
• Italy (source: Centrale dei Bilanci) 
• The Netherlands (source: Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek)2 
• Portugal (source: Banco de Portugal) 
• The United Kingdom (source: Dable, DG III) 
• The United States (source: Department of Com-
merce)2 
• Japan (source: Ministry of Finance) 
• Austria (source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank). 
The "EUROPE" row in the tables, specifically calcu-
lated for the purposes of this study, has been obtained 
by taking the average for the eight European 
countries weighted by each country's relative weight 
in industrial manufacturing output. The combined 
industrial manufacturing output of these eight 
countries accounts, on average, for 97 % ofindustrial 
manufacturing output in the European Union of 
Twelve. 
I Data for the United Kingdom are taken from the DABLE data base. They contain consolidated accounts of 569 enterprises. The DABLE data base is 
administered by DG rn. 
Consolidated accounts. 
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1. PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN ENTERPRISES 
An enterprise is subject to various financial constraints: a 
profitability constraint if it is to survive and safeguard its 
development; a financial equilibrium constraint if it is to 
avoid liquidity crises and excessive dependence on banks 
in particular. International comparisons of the perform-
ances and financial situations of enterprises are necessary 
but difficult. Profound differences exist between the vari-
ous countries' accounting methods; financing methods are 
often specific to each country, especially in the area of 
short-term financing; the concepts used may vary. 
In an attempt to overcome some of these difficulties, the 
European Commission created BACH, a harmonized data 
bank drawing on the accounts of enterprises, with the sup-
port of national public or semi-public bodies responsible 
for centralizing balance-sheet data (see Box 1 ). 
The perl'ormances of enterprises are assessed here on the 
basis of a set of three indicators (see Box 2 for definition 
of these indicators). 
• Overall gross profit ratio (gross profit in relation to 
turnover) 
The overall gross profit provides a measure of an enter-
prise's capacity to generate an overall profit from all its 
activities before deduction of taxes, remuneration of in-
vestors and allocations to provisions. 
• Net profit ratio (net profit in relation to turnover) 
The net profit is calculated by deducting financial 
charges, taxes and depreciation from the gross profit. 
It is sensitive to tax rules and regulations in particular 
and to changes in interest rates. 
• Financial profitability (net profit in relation to equity 
capital) 
This ratio is of particular interest to shareholders. 
Calculated in relation to equity capital employed, it 
gives an indication of the profitability of the private sec-
tor and of any incentive to switch to risk-free fixed-in-
terest investments. 
TABLE I: Overall gross profit ratio - Manufacturing industry (in%) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria 6.9 7.5 8.5 5.8 8.0 
Belgium 9.9 8.6 9_9 !0.0 11.6 
Germany 9.7 9.6 9.8 JO.I 10.5 
Spain ]0_6 ]0_7 11.6 11.0 11.6 
France 7.3 7.7 9.1 10.9 I I .3 
Italy 11.7 12.2 13. I 12.8 13.7 
Netherlands 7.4 9.0 10.4 9.5 10.6 
Portugal 14.8 16.4 
United Kingdom I 1.3 11.4 12.3 12.6 14.0 
EUR-8 <I! 9.9 10 0 !0_9 I L2 12.0 
United States 9.4 10.4 9.5 10.0 
Japan 10.0 9.9 10.3 IO_O 9_7 
,,, EL:R-8 i . .., made up of B, D, E F. f. NL, P and UK. 
Sol{ne: BACH. 
1.1. Overall gross profit ratio 
(gross profit in relation to turnover) 
Over the period from 1985 to 1992 the gross profit ratio of 
European enterprises grew more strongly and more stead-
ily than that of US and Japanese enterprises. On average, 
it is still above that of US and Japanese competitors. 
GRAPH l : Overall gross profit ratio -
Manufacturing industry 
12 ·,_ 
11, 
9' 
' 8 ,_ 
(Ratio of gross _profit to turnover - % ) 
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USA 
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Source: BACH. 
Between 1982 and 1989 European enterprises saw their 
gross profit ratios rise appreciably from 9.9% to 13%, giv-
ing a 3.1 percentage point increase over seven years. That 
increase was particularly marked in certain countries (the 
Netherlands (9% ), France (5.3%) and the United King-
dom (5%)) and was much weaker in Italy and Germany 
( 1.1 % ). A point of convergence was reached in 1987 when 
the spread between the highest and lowest figures was 1.5 
percentage points, compared with 4.4 percentage points in 
I 982. The trend was reversed from 1989, and in three years 
( 1989-92) Europe lost the gains made over the preceding 
four years ( 1985-89). The fall continued in 1993, at least 
in those countries for which data is available. 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
9.5 10.7 10.7 10.3 11.5 !0.4 8.9 
11.6 12.1 13.8 12.8 12-2 122 12.2 
9.7 !0.3 !0.3 10.5 !0.4 10.0 
13.1 14.5 13.9 11.6 9_9 8.0 5.0 
12.4 13.1 12.7 12.1 11.6 11.0 10.3 
12.8 12.5 12.8 12.0 113 11.2 
12.5 14.8 16.4 15.2 16.l 15.3 14.9 
17.7 17.1 16.9 16.4 15.6 14.4 
14.3 15.3 16.6 15.6 15_2 14.2 
12-0 12.7 13.0 12.4 JI .9 IIJ 
11.3 11.8 10.7 10.0 8.7 8.5 9.4 
10.6 I I.I 11.4 11.2 !0_8 9.8 9.0 
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The fall in the gross profit ratio after I 989 was due princi-
pally to the steady decline in activity by manufacturing in-
dustry. While the turnover of European enterprises rose 
sharply from 1983 to 1989 ( 18% in volume terms over the 
period), the annual rate of growth at constant prices fell 
steadily after 1989 (4.7% in 1989, 3.1% in 1990, 1.4% in 
1991, -0.5% in 1992 and -3.7% in 1993). By 1993, in-
dustry had returned to a turnover level comparable in vol-
ume terms to that recorded in 1989. This reduction in turn-
over of course brought about an appreciable fall in the rate 
of utilization of production capacity, down from 85.6% in 
1989 to 77 .6% in 1993 (i.e. almost 8 percentage points 
less). 
1.2. Net profit ratio 
(net profit in relation to turnover) 
GRAPH 2 : Net profit ratio -
Manufacturing industry 
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From an enterprise's viewpoint, the net profit ratio is par-
ticularly important since it is the final result, i.e. the enter-
prise's actual profit which, after payment of taxes and fi-
nancial costs, will be the source either of shareholder 
remuneration - in the form of dividends- or of self-financ-
ing by allocations to reserves. Movement of this indicator 
TABLE 2: Net profit ratio - Manufacturing industry (in % ) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria -I.I -0.2 0.8 -1.5 0.3 
Belgium 0.9 0.4 1.7 1.8 2.2 
Germany l.5 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.5 
Spain -2.9 -2.7 -1.5 -0.3 0.9 
France -1.3 -0.8 -1.3 0.5 1.2 
Italy -1.8 ---0.7 0.8 l.3 2.4 
Netherlands l.3 2.6 4.4 3.6 4.0 
Portugal -2.5 -0.6 
United Kingdom 3.6 4.4 4.9 52 6.1 
EUR-g(i) _____ 0.4 1.0 1.5 2.1 2.8 
United States 3.7 4.5 3.7 3.7 
Japan 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.2 
,,, 
EUR-8 is made of B. D. E. F. L NL. P and UK. 
Source: BACH. 
will therefore determine an enterprise's investment poten-
tial. 
Unlike the gross profit ratio, the net profit ratio of European 
enterprises is on average lower than that of US enterprises. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, however, there was strong 
convergence between the United States, Japan and the 
European Union. 
From 1982 to 1989 European enterprises saw a spectacular 
tenfold improvement in their net profit ratios (from 0.4% 
in 1982 to 4% in 1989). Three countries - Spain, France 
and Italy - even reversed a situation which was negative in 
1982. In the case of Spain, the ratio remained negative 
until 1985 but then exceeded the European average ( 4%) 
in 1989 ( 4.8% ). Germany maintained positive and relative-
ly stable performances throughout the period. Its ratio 
stood at 2.4% at the end of this eight-year period, 
i.e. below the European average. The greatest convergence 
seems to have occurred in 1990, except for the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom where the existence of consoli-
dated balance sheets improves this type of ratio. The maxi-
mum divergence from the average was 1.8 percentage 
points compared with 3.1 percentage points in 1982. 
From 1989 there was a continuous sharp threefold decrease 
in the net profit ratio (from 4% in 1989 to 1.3% in 1992). 
In 1992 it reached its lowest level for nine years. In those 
countries for which data were available, this fall continued 
and even worsened in 1993. 
For the first time in ten years, a number of countries again 
recorded negative ratios in 1992 (Spain -3.0%, Italy-1.5% 
and Portugal -0.7%). 
1.3. Financial profitability 
At the beginning of the 1990s the financial profitability of 
European enterprises was very similar to that of their US 
and Japanese counterparts. From 1982 to 1989 European 
enterprises saw a constant and sustained improvement in 
their financial profitability ratio, which rose from 1.6% to 
14.4%, giving a ninefold rise in seven years (a discounted rate 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
1.9 3.1 3.2 2.5 3.3 2.2 0.5 
2.1 2.5 4.0 2.5 1.4 1.0 0.5 
2.3 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.1 1.4 
3.1 4.7 4.8 2.2 0.0 -3.0 -6.6 
2.7 3.6 3.6 2.7 2.1 1.2 0.6 
2.1 1.9 2.4 1.3 0.2 -1.5 
5.3 6.9 8.4 6.4 7.3 6.0 5.9 
2.7 2.8 3.4 3.2 1.3 -0.7 
6.6 7.4 7.6 6.4 6.1 5.1 
3.2 38 4.0 3.1 2.7 1.3 
4.9 5.7 4.7 3.8 2.3 1.0 2.6 
1.7 2.2 2.3 2.2 1.7 10 0.6 
of increase of 36. 9% a year). A number of countries, start-
ing from negative situations (Spain -8.8%, France -8.6% 
and Italy -7.6%), achieved spectacular improvements. 
But there was an appreciable improvement in all European 
countries: Portugal, which was still in a negative position 
in 1986, recorded 8. 9% in 1989; Belgium improved its per-
formance threefold; Germany maintained a constantly 
positive position well above the European average. 
In 1989, the level of European convergence seemed very 
high. But a process of sharp deterioration then set in, and 
the average financial profitability of European manufactur-
ing industries has steadily declined for five years. In 1992 
it touched its lowest level for nine years (4.4% ). In that 
year a number of countries recorded negative financial 
profitability: Spain (-8. 7% ), Italy (-5 .3%) and Portugal 
(-1.7%). In 1993 those countries for which data were 
available again saw their performance levels of the previ-
ous year halved. 
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The majority of shareholders of European manufacturing 
enterprises have thus been hard hit by the recession, which 
could have an impact on the attractiveness of equity invest-
GRAPH 3 : Financial profitability ----
Manufacturing industry 
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TABLE 3: }"inancial profitability---- Manufacturing industry (in%) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria -8.0 -l.3 5.6 -11.0 2.0 
Belgium 4.3 2.0 7.9 7.7 8.4 
Germany !0.7 13.0 14.7 16.4 16.0 
Spain -8.8 -8.2 -4.4 -1.0 2.5 
France -8.6 -5.5 -10.0 3.0 6.7 
Italy -7.6 -2.8 3.2 5.2 9.l 
Netherlands 3.9 7.6 12.3 lO.I 10.3 
Portugal -12.1 -2.3 
United Kingdom 8.7 10.9 12.1 12.8 14.3 
EUR----8 (]J 1.6 4.2 5.9 9.2 II.I 
United States 9.8 12.8 10.3 !0.3 
Japan 7.7 7.5 8.7 7.7 5.3 
,,, EUR-8 is made up of B. D. E. EI. NL P and UK. 
Soufft': BACH. 
ment in the private sector. Furthermore, the scope for self--
financed growth has diminished. 
The difference between the financial profitability of Euro-
pean enterprises and nominal long-term interest rates in 
the public sector narrowed steadily between 1982 and 
1985, largely as a result of the improved performance of en-
terprises. In 1986, for the first time since the beginning of 
the 1980s, the financial profitability ratio exceeded long-
term interest rates (by 2.3 percentage points). From 1987 
to 1990, despite a steady rise in the cost of money, the dif-
ference remained positive, reaching a maximum of 4. 7 per-
centage points in 1988 and 1989. 
From 1991 , despite a new fall in interest rates, the gap be-
came negative (-5.4 percentage points in 1992); then, after 
that, European enterprises were faced with both a con-
tinued fall in their financial profitability and a resumed up-
ward movement in interest rates on long-term public-sec-
tor bonds. The fall in share prices which occurred clearly 
owed much to the low level of European enterprises' finan-
cial profitability compared with the return on government 
bonds. 
GRAPH 4 : Financial profitability of enterprises and long-term 
interest rates ---- Manufacturing industry 
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
10.0 16.2 16.4 12.0 13.6 6.8 
7.9 9.4 13.5 8.0 -U 3.0 
14.3 16.3 15.9 16.2 13.6 9.1 
8.6 12.1 11.8 5.6 -D. I -8.7 
13.2 15.4 14.9 10.6 7.5 4.1 
7.8 7.1 8.9 4.5 0.8 -5.3 
12.3 15.4 18.2 13.4 13.4 II.I 
9.4 7.8 8.9 7.1 3.0 -1.7 
16.1 15.8 17.6 15.2 12.9 106 
12.5 13.7 14.4 11.6 8.7 4.4 
13.6 15.9 13.3 10.3 6.1 2.8 
7.2 8.9 8.7 8 () 6.2 3.5 
1993 
1.6 
1.5 
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2.0 
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7.9 
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1.4. Conclusion regarding performances 
Between 1982 and 1989 there was a remarkable improve-
ment, thanks in particular to the greater efficiency of pro-
ductive equipment, in the performance of European enter-
prises as measured by gross profit ratios ( + 3 .1 percentage 
points) and net profit ratios (+3.6 percentage points). A 
very unfavourable situation in 1982 (financial profitability 
of 1.6%, i.e. a differential of-7 .1 percentage points in rela-
tion to inflation and of -11.1 percentage points in relation 
to long-term interest rates) was turned into a favourable 
situation in 1989 (financial profitability of 14.4%, i.e. a 
differential of +9.7 percentage points in relation to infla-
tion and of +4.7 percentage points in relation to long-term 
interest rates). Enterprises then clearly enjoyed a positive 
leverage effect. The income of shareholders could be in-
creased by using borrowed funds. Once the economic prof-
itability of a firm exceeds the rate of interest on borrow-
ings, financial profitability improves all the more as the 
debt ratio rises; this is the positive leverage effect. 
Between 1989 and 1992 the situation changed radically: all 
performance indicators became negative. In 1992 the dif-
ferential between financial profitability and the rate of 
inflation again became negative (-0.2 of a percentage 
point), as did that between financial profitability and nom-
inal long-term interest rates (-4.4 percentage points). 
Continuation of this sort of situation could prompt share-
holders to shun investment in manufacturing industry, al-
though the high elasticity of financial profitability with re-
spect to economic improvement gives investors cause to 
expect an improvement in their situation. 
2. CHARGES BORNE BY ENTERPRISES 
On average, purchases of goods and services are the main 
item of expenditure for enterprises (equivalent to some 
60% of turnover). This relative share of purchases of 
course depends both on the cost of raw materials and busi-
ness services and on the degree to which recourse is had to 
subcontracting. Staff costs (equivalent to some 20% of 
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turnover) comprise wages and salaries, including all social 
security contributions. The gross profit realized by an en-
terprise is what is left once purchases of goods and services 
and staff costs have been covered. The performances of en-
terprises described in the previous section therefore depend 
to a large extent on changes in those charges. Finally, this 
section examines the share of financial charges, i.e. the 
necessary remuneration of providers of external capital. 
The share of financial charges will depend on financing 
structures and movements in interest rates. 
2.1. Purchases as a proportion of turnover 
The proportion of purchases of goods and services in rela-
tion to turnover differs appreciably from one European 
country to another. It is very high in Italy, the Netherlands 
and Belgium (approximately 72% in 1992) but is apprecia-
bly lower in Germany and Spain. These differences can be 
explained by a whole range of factors: specialization by in-
dustry in sectors that are raw-material intensive to differ-
ing degrees, varying degree of subcontracting, and, of 
course, the relative share of other charges. It is therefore 
more instructive to analyse this ratio in terms of trend. 
Viewed from this angle, the cost of purchases of goods and 
services remained fairly stable throughout the 1980s 
(64.3% in 1982, 63.9% in 1990). From 1990 there was a 
steady fall in this ratio, which continued in 1993. Reduc-
tions in the cost of raw materials played a major part in this 
trend. 
The sharp downward movement in raw material prices 
which characterized the 1984-88 period led to a two-per-
centage-point reduction in the share of purchases, a sub-
stantial change given the inertia of this ratio. 
After 1989, the elasticity of the share of purchases with re-
spect to changes in raw material prices seems to have been 
less pronounced. The rise in raw material prices which 
began in 1993 could lead, however, to an increase in the 
share of purchases in the turnover of enterprises. 
It does not therefore look as if the deterioration in the per-
formances of European enterprises from 1989/90 has been 
TABLE4: Purchases of goods and services as a proportion of turnover - Manufacturing industry ( in % ) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Austria 54.5 54.3 58.5 58.3 53.4 53.6 52.2 54.2 54.5 53.8 52.3 52.0 
Belgium 74.2 75.9 74.8 74.8 72.3 72.l 72.9 74.2 73.8 73.6 73.0 720 
Germany 56.l 55.7 56.6 56.9 54.3 53.0 53.3 54.7 54.0 53.5 52.6 
Spain 54.4 55.6 55.0 55.6 54.4 53.8 54.8 55.6 54.6 56.2 57.6 57.5 
France 68.9 68.9 69.3 69.7 67.2 66.3 67.l 69.0 69.5 69.3 69.5 68.5 
Italy 72.4 72.0 73.6 73.5 72.2 72.8 73.2 74.4 74. l 73.4 73.0 
Netherlands 75.8 74.8 76.1 76.5 74.3 72.1 7 \.5 72.2 72.7 71.9 72.0 71.8 
Portugal 70.0 69.2 68.5 69.7 69.2 69.7 69.5 69.3 
United Kingdom 
EUR-8 OJ 64.3 64.2 64.9 65.3 63.l 62.4 62.9 64.2 63.9 63.6 63.3 
United States 
Japan 75.1 75.7 74.9 75.l 75.3 73.9 73.8 74.0 74.4 74.0 73.6 73.5 
ill EUR-8 is made up of B. D. E. F. 1. NL. P aod UK. 
Source : BACH. 
due to an increase in the share of purchases of goods and 
services. 
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- UNO and IMP for historical data (DG II). 
2.2. Trend in staff costs 
Staff costs, which serve to measure the cost of!abour, cover 
social charges ( compulsory contributions by employees 
and employers) as well as wages and salaries. They consti-
tute a heavy burden on enterprises (second largest item 
after purchases) and vary with changes in the compensa-
tion of employees and the taxation of labour. 
The level of staff costs also depends on the extent to which 
external labour is taken into account, the existence of em-
ployee participation schemes and the inclusion of pension 
fund provisions in the accounts. The ratio used here 
measures such costs in relation to turnover, i.e. in relation 
to the level of activity of the enterprise. The differences in 
level between countries may be explained by differences in 
the levels of productivity (turnover per employee), com-
pensation of employees and social charges. 
The limited weight of staff costs in relation to turnover in 
Japan compared to the European average can be explained 
TABLE 5: Staff costs as a proportion of turnover (in%) 
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1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria 24.9 24.9 24.3 24.1 25.9 
Belgium 21.4 20.4 19.5 19.5 20.1 
Germany 24.6 24.3 23.8 23.5 24.8 
Spain 23.7 22.2 21 .2 20.2 20.4 
France 24.5 24.0 23.0 22.7 22.2 
Italy 20.1 19.9 18.5 18.3 18.2 
Netherlands 18.9 18.6 16.3 16.l 17.5 
Portugal 15.7 16.9 
United Kingdom 24.1 23.9 23.l 23.2 22.8 
EUR-8 m 23.2 22.8 21.9 21.6 21.9 
United States 
Japan 16.1 15.6 15.9 16 16.3 
l]I EUR-8 1s made up of B, D. E, F. I. NL P and L'K. 
Sou1n' BACH. 
partly by high labour productivity, by the low level of so-
cial security contributions and by the greater use of subcon-
tracting in Japan than in Europe. The level of staff costs in 
Germany, which fluctuates between 23.5% and 25.7% of 
turnover, is well above the level in the other countries ( es-
pecially after 1986). In I 992 it rose to virtually its highest 
level ever (25 .6% ). Part of the explanation clearly lies in 
the fact that German pension fund provisions are included 
in staff costs and boost their share; this situation does not 
seem detrimental to German enterprises since, while not 
disbursed, these provisions are an element of self-financ-
ing in the same way as depreciation allocations. The high 
level of wages and salaries in Germany is also a contribu-
tory factor. At the other end of the scale, Portugal recorded 
ratios ranging from 15.7% to 18.5% over the period 
1982-92; this is in part explained by low levels of remuner-
ation. It will also be noted that the level in Austria is con-
sistently above the European average and close to that in 
Germany. However, the gap is tending to narrow (for 
example, it was 3.8 percentage points in 1988 but was 
down to I percentage point by 1992). 
Taking the average for European enterprises, the trend of 
staff costs as a proportion of turnover was fairly uneven 
over the period from 1982 to 1989. Periods of increase al-
ternated with periods of decline, but changes were limited 
in magnitude. From 1990, however, a steady upward 
movement began, with the average proportion rising from 
20.9% in ]989 to 22.2% in 1992 (+1.3 percentage points). 
This unfavourable trend seems to have persisted in 1993. 
Furthermore, the share of staff costs has not followed the 
same trend in the eight European countries. 
Between 1982 and 1989 most of the countries experienced 
an appreciable reduction in staff costs, except for Germany 
and the Netherlands, where they rose from 1985 onwards, 
and Portugal which, except in 1989 (15.8%), saw a steady 
increase from 1985. Over this same period, the largest re-
ductions in staff costs were recorded in France (-5 percen-
tage points), Spain (-4.2 percentage points) and Belgium 
(-2.9 percentage points); this tallies with observations 
made regarding the sharp decline in the corrected wage 
1987 1988 1989 
25.9 25.3 24.5 
20.3 19.2 18.5 
25.7 25.1 24.4 
19.7 19.3 19.5 
21.9 20.7 19.5 
18.4 18 0 17.9 
18.8 18.0 17.1 
16.8 16.5 15.8 
22.6 22.3 21.6 
22.2 21.5 20.9 
16.5 16 15.6 
1990 1991 
24.9 24.4 
19.4 20.5 
24.7 25.0 
20.7 21.4 
19.7 20.1 
18.3 19.2 
17.4 18.2 
17.2 18.2 
22.0 22.5 
21.3 21.8 
15.5 16.1 
1992 
24.3 
20.8 
25.6 
21.1 
20.4 
19.2 
18.2 
18.5 
23.1 
22.2 
17.1 
1993 
24.2 
21.4 
22.6 
20.7 
18.7 
17.8 
share in those three countries. From 1990 a general in-
crease in staff costs as a proportion of turnover can be seen, 
with especially sharp rises in Portugal (+2.7 percentage 
points), Spain ( + 1.6 percentage points, followed by an im-
provement in the ratio in 1992), Belgium (+2.3 percentage 
points, followed by a further deterioration in the ratio to 
21.4% in 1993) and the United Kingdom (+1.5 percentage 
points). This increase can be attributed to a combination 
of rising labour costs and slackening business activity 
(time needed for adjustment of wage bill). 
2.3. Trend in financial charges 
An enterprise's financial charges essentially constitute in-
terest paid on loans, even though the concept of "financial 
charges" used here, for reasons inherent in the technical 
problems of international comparability, is broader than 
the traditional concept of "interest paid". In certain 
countries in particular, it includes negative foreign-ex-
change differences ( such differences represent varying pro-
portions of financial charges depending on the country in 
question and range from 5% to 15%). Financial charges 
therefore principally reflect the cost of a firm's debt, and 
their level is directly influenced both by size of the debt and 
by movements in interest rates. 
Jn theory, enterprises should tend to run down debt in 
periods of rising interest rates and, conversely, increase 
their debt when interest rates are low. In practice, for very 
diverse reasons (organization of capital markets, credit po-
licies, historical circumstances, etc.), enterprises do not al-
ways have sufficient room for manoeuvre to retain control 
over their financial strategy. 
By comparison with their US counterparts, European and 
Japanese enterprises have historically faced a greater 
burden of financial charges (averaging 3.0% and 2.8% re-
spectively over the period 1982-91, as against 0.6% in the 
United States over the period 1986-91, the years for which 
data are available). The main explanation for this lies in a 
higher level of debt. 
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In 1992, however, the gap narrowed considerably: the rise 
in short-term interest rates in the United States, where debt 
is frequently denominated in variable rates, caused the 
ratio to increase sharply to 3.2%, a level very close to that 
in Europe (3.5%, the narrowest gap over the period re-
viewed) and even above that in Japan (2.8%, where, more-
over, there was a 0.2 percentage point reduction in that 
year). But in 1993 there was a substantial fall in financial 
charges in the United States and Japan, whereas for those 
European countries for which data are available no such 
fall has yet been noted. 
In Europe the period between 1982 and 1988 was marked 
by a continual and significant reduction in financial 
charges as a proportion of turnover, from 3.9% to 2.3%. Jn 
1982 the difference between the highest and lowest levels 
of financial charges was 6.1 percentage points. Spain and 
Italy had particularly high levels (8.1 % and 7% respective-
ly), while Germany, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom had the most favourable levels (2.5%, 2.3% and 2.3% 
respectively). 
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TABLE6: Financial charges as a proportion of turnover - Manufacturing industry ( in % ) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Austria 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.2 
Belgium 3.7 3.0 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.6 2.4 3.0 3.4 3.8 4.l 4.3 
Germany 2.5 l.9 1.9 l.7 1.7 l.5 l.6 1.7 l.9 2.3 2.7 
Spain 8.1 8.1 7.4 5.8 4.8 4.2 3.3 3.2 3.6 4.1 5.0 5.9 
France 3.7 3.5 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.7 
Italy 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.0 4.1 3.4 3.5 3.6 4.2 4.3 5.2 
Netherlands 2.3 2.0 l.8 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.7 3.0 3.4 3.3 
Portugal 9.9 9.3 7.4 6.2 6.0 6.5 6.8 7.1 
United Kingdom 2.3 1.7 l.8 1.8 l.8 1.6 1.7 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.7 
EUR-8 Ol 3.9 3.5 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.5 
United States 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.4 3.2 1.8 
Japan 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.5 
\!) EUR-8 is made up uf B. D. E. F. I. NL. P and UK. 
Sourcl:' : BACH. 
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TABLE 7: Apparent rate of interest (in % ) 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria 8.2 7.1 6.8 7.0 6.0 
Belgium 11.6 10.4 I I.I 11.5 11.3 
Germany 
Spain 13.5 12.9 13.5 12.3 11.2 
France 14.1 12.8 I0.6 I0.8 IO.O 
Italy 14.8 14.6 13.0 12.2 10.2 
Netherlands 6.6 5.6 5.5 4.9 4.9 
Portugal 20.1 19.5 
United Kingdom 10.0 7.6 7.3 7.7 6.6 
EUR-8 (ll 11.7 10.2 9.6 9.5 8.6 
United States 1.4 
Japan 9.6 9.1 8.5 8.2 7.6 
,1, ElJR.-8 i, made up of B. D. E. F I. NL. P and liK. 
Source BACH. 
The subsequent general reduction in the relative share of fi-
nancial charges was particular! y marked for those countries 
with a high level at the outset. Thus, between 1987 and 
1988, levels in Spain, Italy, Portugal, France and Belgium 
moved much closer to those in Germany, the United King-
dom and the Netherlands. The spread in ratios between the 
seven countries that were recorded at the outset fell back to 
1.9 percentage points in 1988. 
From 1989 there was a radical reversal of trend, and the av-
erage proportion of financial charges in Europe increased 
from 2.5% to 3.5% in 1992, thus returning to its 1983 level. 
The pace of increase varied between countries: it was fairly 
rapid in Belgium and the Netherlands, where the level in 
1991 was higher than that in 1982 (as early as 1990 in the 
United Kingdom), but was more modest overall for the 
other countries. The gap between the highest and lowest 
ratios (as represented by Portugal and Germany respective-
ly) was 4.4 percentage points in 1992, as against 4.6 per-
centage points in 1988. The change of trend after 1988 was 
not due to an increase in corporate indebtedness but was 
caused instead by the renewed rise in interest rates. 
Changes in the financial charges of European enterprises 
remain closely linked to movements in interest rates. A 
combination of factors is at work here: monetary policies 
TABLE 8: Ratio of financial charges to gross profit 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria 51.6 42.6 32.7 37.0 31.6 
Belgium 45.1 37.4 34.7 34.3 30.0 
Germany 31.0 23.2 22.4 20.0 19.4 
Spain 82.9 85.l 65.4 59.0 44.8 
France 48.8 45.0 45.2 38.5 29.8 
Italy 69.0 62.7 51 .3 46.l 35.0 
Netherlands 40.9 28.9 23.4 21.0 19.3 
Portugal 71.4 65.5 
United Kingdom 22.8 16.7 16.4 16.4 14.5 
EUR-8 (l) 44.4 38.3 34.3 31.2 25.9 
United States 4.0 
Japan 41.3 39.8 34.4 34.9 37.5 
,1, EUR-8 is made up of R. D, E. F. I. NL P and UK. 
Sourct': BACH. 
1987 1988 1989 
5.1 4.6 4.7 
9.5 8.5 9.7 
I I.I 9.9 10.2 
9.5 8.8 8.9 
8.1 8.2 8.5 
4.5 4.5 5.1 
16.8 15.0 14.6 
6.2 6.3 6.9 
7.6 7.5 7.9 
0.8 0.9 1.6 
6.9 6.4 6.8 
1990 1991 
5.2 5.6 
10.3 J0.2 
10.5 13.8 
9.7 9.3 
8.9 9 
5.8 5.8 
16.4 16.9 
6.8 6.2 
8.5 9.0 
2.5 3.7 
7.4 7.7 
1992 
6.4 
10.4 
15.l 
10.l 
I0.7 
6.2 
17.3 
5.4 
9.8 
8.6 
6.6 
1993 
5.9 
10.2 
15.3 
9.5 
4.9 
5.8 
pursued, the balance between savings and investment. and 
microeconomic structural conditions. 
Examination of the apparent interest rate, which re-
lates financial charges to balance-sheet debt (bearing in 
mind, however, that the debt at the balance-sheet date may 
GRAPH 7 : Apparent rate of interest -
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1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
23.3 17.5 17.1 20.5 21.4 
25.l 21.6 27.7 34.5 40.8 
17.6 17.5 19.5 21.4 27.6 
37.5 26.8 28.3 39.6 53.5 
24.8 20.1 20.8 26.0 25.5 
30.3 30.8 35.3 42.5 47.5 
17.1 15.6 18.6 26.0 29.4 
49.7 43.0 40.0 47.8 55.8 
12.6 12.2 17.2 20.8 20.5 
22.3 20.5 23.3 2X.2 32.2 
2.4 2.6 5.5 9.3 15.5 
30.7 25.7 27.6 31.0 34.7 
92 93 
1992 1993 
27.6 25.5 
45.4 48.9 
34.7 
73.5 134.6 
29.0 30.3 
58.0 
33.9 35.1 
63.l 
20.0 
38.7 
34.7 18.2 
35.2 35.9 
differ widely from average debt over the financial year), 
confirms the previous conclusions. Compared with their 
Japanese competitors, European enterprises pay a higher 
apparent interest rate (higher by almost 3 percentage points 
in 1992). 
Since 1988 enterprises have had to allocate a growing pro-
portion of their gross trading result (or gross profit) to the 
remuneration of borrowed capital. 
The last decade divides into two diametrically opposed 
phases: from 1982 to 1988 this proportion fell from 44.4% 
to 20.5%; after 1988 it rose continually to 38.7% last year. 
The trend is similar in the United States and Japan. The 
dispersion between European countries is again very high, 
ranging from 73.5% in Spain to 29% in France in 1992. 
3. FINANCIAL STRUCTURES OF EUROPEAN 
ENTERPRISES 
3.1. Analysis of indebtedness 
By analysing the indebtedness of enterprises it is possible 
to identify the choices made by them in financing their acti-
vities. In very simple terms, an enterprise has two major 
sources of finance: first, its own funds, which it builds up 
by calling on shareholders or through self-financing (allo-
cating profits to reserves) and, second, funds it obtains 
from external lenders, essentially banks but also bond 
markets. 
Analysing an enterprise's financing structure thus provides 
valuable pointers not only to the reasons for the level of its 
performance, but also to its degree of dependence on exter-
nal lenders. The concept of debt used here is the overall in-
debtedness ratio, which reflects the proportion of debt in 
the balance sheet. All debt is taken into consideration, i.e. 
not only bank debt, which accounts for the bulk of total 
debt, but also bond issues, commercial, tax and social se-
curity debts, any intra-group debt, etc. 
In general, enterprises in Europe and Japan have structural-
ly higher levels of debt than those in the United States, 
where capital markets are traditionally a much more im-
portant source of finance and where there is far less re-
course to inter-company loans. The United Kingdom is 
similar to the United States in this respect. 
Nonetheless, the overall ratio of indebtedness of European 
enterprises fell from 1983 to 1989 in parallel with that of 
Japanese firms, whereas US enterprises saw an appreciable 
increase in their debt ratios over the same period (from 
38.9% in 1983 to 46.7% in 1989), which thus moved much 
closer to European levels. 
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Over the period 1982 to 1987, the overall debt ratios of en-
terprises moved downwards in all the European countries, 
at a faster rate in the countries where they were highest 
(France, Spain and Portugal) than elsewhere (Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands). However, in the 
first three years of this period, France was unusual in hav-
ing an opposite trend: French enterprises' ratio of indebted-
ness, already the highest in 1982, continued to rise and 
peaked at 77.7% in 1984. 
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After 1987, the move to reduce debt stalled in some 
countries (Belgium, Germany) and there was even a slight 
increase in debt in others (United Kingdom, Netherlands, 
Italy); the process of reducing debt continued up to 1992 
in France and in Portugal and up to 1991 in Spain (followed 
by an appreciable rise of 3.1 percentage points in 1992). 
In 1992 the spread between the lowest and highest overall 
indebtedness ratios narrowed ( 17 .6 percentage points as 
compared with 25.5 percentage points in 1982). Thus, 
since 1982, European enterprises have made substantial 
progress overall in consolidating their financial structures: 
by reducing the proportion of debt in their financing, they 
have given a strong boost to equity capital. This change in 
balance-sheet structures reflects a radical improvement in 
the financial independence of firms, although the process 
has marked time since the cyclical downturn (stabilization 
of the overall debt ratio). 
From 1990 there was a marked slowdown in activity in 
manufacturing industry and a decline in the volume of in-
vestment (1991-93 period). This caused net profits of 
European enterprises to fall sharply. Their capacity to build 
up reserves as an internal source of capital was thus dimin-
ished. The process of overall debt reduction, significant 
over the period from 1984 to 1989, came to a halt. A further 
consequence was a reduction in funding needs for the oper-
ating cycle and equipment. This development compen-
sated for the effect of the fall in profitability on the level of 
overall indebtedness. 
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GRAPH 9 : Indebtedness, activity and profit -
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3.2. Changes in the structure of debt 
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By studying the composition and nature of indebtedness by 
debt maturity, it is possible, in theory, to evaluate part of 
the financial constraints borne by enterprises. Long-term 
debt, traditionally more stable and less expensive, reflects 
the degree of confidence placed in them by the banking sys-
tem. However, it is awkward to make international com-
parisons in this area because of the differences in behaviour 
and habits within each country (banking traditions, method 
of commercial financing, role played by real or personal 
guarantees, etc.). US enterprises continue to have a more 
stable debt structure, with a ratio consistently more than 
some 30 percentage points above the European average 
over the period 1989-92; this is all the more remarkable in 
that their overall indebtedness ratio has remained some 
7 percentage points below the European average for the 
last four years. 
Over the eleven years from 1982 to 1992, the average gen-
eral trend reflects an increase in the Jong-term debt of 
TABLE 9: Overall indebtedness ratio 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
Austria 66.6 64.8 61.9 62.5 60.2 
Belgium 66.4 63.7 62.0 59. I 57.2 
Germany 55.9 54.8 53.4 52.2 50.4 
Spain 68.3 68.8 64.9 61.9 60.2 
France 70.3 71.0 77.7 73.6 710 
Italy 69.0 66.7 67.5 66.J 64.7 
Netherlands 51.5 51.1 49.2 49.4 47.7 
Portugal 72.3 67.0 
United Kingdom 
EUR-80l - - 63.2 62.4 630 61 I 59.2 
United States 38.9 39.6 40.7 42.6 
Japan 69.7 69.9 69.1 67.8 66.8 
,,, EUR-8 is made up of H. D. E. I" I. NL. P and UK. 
Source : BACH. 
European enterprises expressed as a proportion of total in-
debtedness (ratio up from 29.3% to 31.1%). This general 
picture conceals a number of differences and contrasting 
developments within the eight European countries studied. 
Italy and Spain rely more heavily than average on short-
term debt for their financing. In Italy this reliance has even 
increased since 1986, while Spain made up a slight amount 
of leeway in 1992. France, which had a high proportion of 
short-term debt in 1982, had, by the end of the period and 
foJlowing a series of marked fluctuations, become one of 
the four countries in the European sample (United King-
dom, the Netherlands, Belgium and France) that have 
greatest recourse to medium- or long-term borrowing 
(33.9%). 
Throughout the ten years from 1982 to 1992, the trend in 
financial charges borne by European enterprises closely 
correlated ( coefficient of 0.84) that of both short-term and 
Jong-term interest rates. Any one percentage point move-
ment in interest rates was reflected in an approximate 0.5 per -
centage point change in financial charges in relation to turn-
over. The high share of short-term debt in the overall 
indebtedness of European enterprises (70.7% on average 
over the period from 1982 to 1992) makes them more 
sensitive to changes in short-term interest rates. Over the 
period from 1989 to 1992, the inversion of the interest-rate 
curve showed up in financial charges; as a proportion of 
gross profits they rose from 23.3% in 1989 to 38.7% in 
1992. From 1994, the decline in short-term interest rates 
should directly benefit the profitability of European enter-
pnses. 
Conclusion regarding structures 
European enterprises steadily shed debt between 1982 
(overalJ indebtedness ratio of 63.2%) and 1989 (overalJ in-
debtedness ratio of 56.6%) despite a sharp fall in profits 
(loss of 2. 7 percentage points net profit and I O percentage 
points financial profitability over the period). The situation 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
57.7 56.6 55.4 54.7 51.7 48.9 48.l 
56.7 57.7 57.6 57.5 58.5 59.2 58.5 
49.0 49.l 50.1 50.0 50.4 50.0 
56.4 5'2.9 50.6 52.7 55.9 59.0 62.3 
67.5 64.4 62.0 61.8 60.l 58.5 58.0 
65.0 66.l 66.3 65.9 65.1 66.5 
47.1 47.4 48.2 49.4 49.5 50.2 50.6 
64.7 59.3 56.9 51.1 53.6 52.7 
-----~~----~·---·---"-·---~--
57.6 56.9 56.6 56.6 56.5 56.7 
43.9 45.3 46.7 46.9 46.4 47.8 47.2 
65.3 64.7 63.9 637 63.2 62.8 62.3 
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TABLE 10: Debt structure 
1982 1983 
Austria 31.5 33.9 
Belgium 28.5 25.3 
Germany 29.6 30.1 
Spain 33.2 30.5 
France 26.8 28.4 
Italy 23.7 22.96 
Netherlands 34.7 35.5 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 34.8 32.9 
EUR-8 (I) 29.3 29.0 
United States 53.6 
Japan 26.3 26.6 
'I I EUR-8 is made up of B. D. E. F. I. NL. P and UK. 
Source BACH. 
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1986 
34.4 
25.4 
30.0 
27.9 
32.2 
17.7 
32.5 
35.6 
36.0 
29.0 
56.4 
27.7 
in 1989 was then maintained until 1992 ( overall indebted-
ness ratio of 56.7% ), largely as a result of the decline in ac-
tivity and fall in the volume of investment. From 1995, the 
upturn in activity (manufacturing output forecast to rise by 
3.8%) and investment (forecast growth of 9% in volume 
terms) will impose increased funding needs on European 
enterprises. The continuation of high real long-term in-
terest rates (forecast to be 5.7% in I 995 and 5.4% in I 996) 
is unlikely to alter European enterprises' preference for re-
ducing debt. Will self-financing be sufficient to finance the 
recovery? 
4. THE SITUATION OF EUROPEAN SMEs 
This section compares the financial situation of SMEs with 
that of large enterprises in manufacturing industry. Per-
formances (section 1), charges (section 2) and financial 
structure (section 3) are covered in tum. 
However, not all the national data necessary for comparing 
the situation of SMEs with that of large enterprises are 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
30.6 29.8 29.4 28.5 
28.7 29.1 29.7 -33.2 
28.8 28.5 27.1 26.3 
25.9 25.6 22.9 21.6 
30.7 29.3 30.9 32.8 
17.6 16.7 16.1 16.7 
34.2 34.9 32.8 38.0 
38.3 35.9 33.3 34.4 
33.1 32.5 39.8 50 l 
28.0 27.4 28.1 30.3 
57.4 59.9 61.8 61.7 
28.2 28.6 30.7 31.5 
1991 
28.1 
33.6 
25.6 
23.1 
33.5 
17.1 
36.8 
33.4 
53.0 
30.8 
62.5 
33.8 
1992 
29.2 
34.4 
25.5 
25.1 
33.9 
17.1 
36.0 
31.4 
53.8 
31.1 
63.0 
35.1 
1993 
29.2 
35.5 
25.1 
34.1 
37.5 
63.4 
37.3 
available. Only six countries provide comparisons by size 
of enterprise: Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands and Portugal. The analyses set out here are therefore 
not representative of all countries available in BACH. The 
figures for SMEs and large enterprises given here are a 
weighted average of the EUR 6 countries for which this 
comparison is available. The share of each of these 
countries in the six countries' total manufacturing output 
is used here. 
4.1. Performances of European SMEs 
4.1.1. Overall gross profit ratio 
Over the period 1984 to I 992, the overall gross profit ratio 
of European SMEs was more stable than that oflarge enter-
prises. The maximum deviation from average was limited 
to 0.8 of a percentage point, compared with 1.6 percentage 
points for large enterprises. Over the period from 1984 to 
1990 the gross profit ratios of European SMEs were con-
sistently below those of large enterprises. 
TABLE II: Overall gross profit ratio -
(industry) 
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
SMEs 10.I 10.4 11.3 11.7 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.4 11.3 
Large 
11.8 12.1 13.1 13.3 14.0 14.2 12.8 12.0 II.I enterprises 
Output 2.0 3.3 2.4 2.1 4.4 3.7 I .8 -0.2 -1.2 
Sources ·- BACH. 
- Eurn~taL DG II. 
During periods in which economic activity is growing 
SMEs fail to improve their performances at the same pace 
as large enterprises. In periods of recession the gap tends 
to narrow. In 1992 the gross profit ratio of SMEs exceeded 
that of large enterprises by 0.2 of a percentage point. SMEs 
therefore appear to be more resistant to economic recession 
than large enterprises. 
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4.1.2. Net profit ratio 
The relative trends of European SMEs' net profit ratios 
with those of large enterprises are more uneven than those 
of gross profit ratios. From 1984 to 1987 the net perform-
ance of SMEs was better than that of large enterprises and 
- a point to note - SMEs recorded no negative ratio, unlike 
large enterprises (-0.5% in 1984). 
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By contrast, in 1988 and I 989, years in which industrial 
output grew strongly, the net profit ratio oflarge enterprises 
exceeded that of SMEs. Finally, the general fall from I 990 
in the net profit ratios of European enterprises was less pro-
nounced in the case of SMEs. Their net profit ratio again 
exceeded that of large enterprises. 
4.1.3. Financial profitability 
TABLE 12: Financial profitability 
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
SMEs 5.9 7.6 10.1 11.6 12.4 11.9 9.7 6.7 3.7 
Large -5.0 2.1 6.1 9.5 10.8 12.5 6.7 2.9 -3.4 
enterprises 
Souret' : BACH 
Over the period 1984 to 1992, European SMEs' financial 
performance was much better than that oflarge enterprises. 
The financial profitability of large enterprises exceeded 
that of European SMEs only once, in I 989. 
The financial profitability ratios of European SMEs and 
large enterprises show rather uneven trends. Large enter-
prises recorded negative performances in 1984 and 1992. 
This never happened in the case of SMEs over the same 
period. From 1986 a quite marked convergence was noted, 
both in the common trend towards an improvement in the 
financial profitability ratio and in the levels achieved: 
I 2.4% in I 989 for SMEs compared with 10.8% for large 
enterprises. In 1989 both categories showed a fall, al-
though this was clearly less pronounced in the case of 
SMEs, whose position in niche markets is more favourable 
at times when economic activity is slowing or contracting. 
In 1992 SMEs established a considerable lead of 7.1 per-
centage points. 
4.2. Charges borne by European small and me-
dium-sized enterprises 
4.2.1. Purchases as a proportion of turnover 
TABLE 13: Purchases as a proportion of charges borne by 
enterprises 
Purchases/ 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
turnover 
SMEs 71.2 71.0 69.6 69.2 69.8 70.6 69.7 69.1 68.7 
Large 68.5 68.8 66.9 66.8 67.1 68.7 69.2 69.2 69.4 
enterprises 
S<>Uf('(' BACH. 
Between 1984 and 1990 SMEs consistently recorded 
higher purchases as a proportion of turnover than large 
European enterprises. From 1990 the gap reversed in fa-
vour of SMEs (-0.7 of a percentage point in 1992). Faced 
with the same trends in raw material prices and other oper-
ating charges, European SMEs seem to have managed to 
reorganize their production. Following a movement fa-
vourable to SMEs, purchases as a proportion of turnover 
showed a distinctly convergent trend between SMEs and 
large enterprises from 1990. 
4.2.2. Staff costs 
TABLE 14: Staff costs 
84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
SMEs 19.1 18.8 18.9 19.2 18.7 18.5 19.1 19.8 20.3 
Large 21.7 21.1 21.1 20.8 19.9 19.2 19.7 20.3 20.4 
enterprises 
Source : BACH. 
Over the period from 1984 to 1992, European SMEs exper-
ienced an increase in their staff costs in relative terms from 
19. I% to 20.3%, whereas the ratio for large enterprises fell 
from 21.7% to 20.4%. This partly reflects a sharp reduc-
tion in the workforces oflarge enterprises over that period. 
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4.3. Financial structures 
4.3.1. Indebtedness 
GRAPH 12 : Overall indebtedness -
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The overall indebtedness of European SMEs gradually fell 
between 1984 (65.5%) and 1992 (61.8%). However, the 
general debt-shedding process between 1984 and 1991 
was less pronounced in the case of SMEs than in that of 
large enterprises. Having carried appreciably less debt 
than large enterprises from 1984 (--4. 7 percentage points) 
Box2 
to 1987 (-0.5 of a percentage point), SMEs have borrowed 
more since 1988. In 1992, the debt ratio of SMEs stood at 
a level (61.8%) similar to that of large enterprises (60% ). 
4.3.2. Structure of debt 
The overall indebtedness of SMEs is geared more towards 
short-term debt (in 1992, 75.7% of their debt was short-
term, compared with 72% for large enterprises). However, 
the tendency for the proportion of medium- and long-term 
debt to increase was maintained from 1984 (21.5%) to 
1992 (24.3% ), whereas large enterprises experienced a re-
verse trend over the same period (30% in 1984, 28% in 
1992). Carrying more debt, particularly short-term debt, 
SMEs were consistently required to pay a higher apparent 
rate of interest over the period from 1984 to 1992. The year 
1992, however, saw a quite strong convergence of rates 
(gap limited to 0.8 of a percentage point). 
TABLE 15: Debt structure 
Structure 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
SMEs 21.5 21.4 22.3 22.5 22.7 22.4 23.4 23.8 24.3 
Large 30.0 29.7 27.6 27.1 25.9 25.8 27, I 27.7 28.0 
enterprises 
Soune . BACH. 
DEFINITIONS OF RATIOS USED 
(letters and numbers correspond to the Bach nomenclature) 
1 OVERALL GROSS PROFIT RATIO: 
Ratio of net profit or loss +tax on profits + financial charges 
+ depreciation and provisions to turnover exclusive of tax 
2 NET PROFIT RATIO: 
Ratio of net profit or loss for the year to turnover exclusive of tax 
3 FINANCIAL PROFITABILITY: 
Ratio of profit or loss for the financial year to equity capital 
4 RELATIVE SHARE OF PURCHASES: 
Ratio of purchases to turnover exclusive of tax 
5 RELATIVE SHARE OF STAFF COSTS: 
Ratio of staff costs to turnover exclusive of tax 
6 RELATIVE SHARE OF FINANCIAL CHARGES: 
Ratio of financial charges to turnover exclusive of tax 
7 APPARENT RATE OF INTEREST: 
Ratio of financial charges to debt owed to short-term credit institutions 
+ other short-term debt+ long-term debt (more than one year) 
8 FINANCIAL CHARGES AS A PROPORTION OF GROSS TRADING RESULT: 
Ratio of financial charges to gross trading result 
9 OVERALL INDEBTEDNESS RATIO: 
Ratio of short-term debt +long-term debt (more than one year) to balance-sheet total 
10 DEBT STRUCTURE: 
Ratio of long-term debt to long-term debt (more than one year) + short-term debt 
7+13+14+21/1 
21/1 
21/L-A 
5/1 
6/1 
13/1 
I 3/I+F02+F08 
13/V+7 
F+I/XX 
I/I+F 
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Principal economic policy measures - December 1994 
Community (EUR-12) 
5.12 EcoFin Council approves the Annual Council Report on the Implementa-
tion of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. 
5.12 EcoFin Council approves the new convergence programme of the 
Netherlands. 
9-I 0.12 Essen European Council establishes a set of guidelines to consolidate 
growth, improve EC competitiveness and create more jobs. 
13.12 Commission approves Annual Economic Report for 1995. 
Belgium (B) 
None. 
Denmark (DK) 
13.12 The Minister for Economic Affairs declares that schemes for temporary 
withdrawal from the labour market should be financed by employers and uni-
ons and not by the government. A number of minor measures will be taken 
immediately, allowing persons opting for such schemes to withdraw savings 
from private pension funds so as to supplement government grants. 
13.12 The government plans increased "green" taxes on trade, industry and 
agriculture. The main taxes will be those on C02, S02, pesticides, waste water, 
solvents and cadmium. They will bring in some DKR 7 billion a year when 
fully introduced in 1998. The yield will be transfened back to business by 
means of grants, lower income taxes, lower company taxes and improved op-
portunities for depreciation of investments. 
Germany (D) 
None. 
Greece (GR) 
1.12 The central government incomes policy for l 995 provides for nominal 
wage increases of 3'Ya on I January and 1 July 1995. 
28.12 The 1995 budget forecasts a central government deficit of9.8% of GDP, 
down from 12% of GDP in 1994. The primary surplus is projected at 3.4% of 
GDP in l 995, up from 2% of GDP in l 994. 
Spain (E) 
20.12 A three-year wage agreement between local authorities and unions en-
sures that local civil servants' wages will grow in line with predicted inflation 
in 1995-97. 
France (F) 
None. 
Ireland (IRL) 
None. 
Italy (I) 
20.12 The budget law for 1995 is approved by Parliament. It aims for a gov-
ernment sector deficit of LIT 138 trillion, or 8.0% of GDP, to be achieved 
through a fiscal package amounting to LIT 48 trillion. or 2.8% of GDP. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None. 
Netherlands (NL) 
None. 
Portugal (P) 
None. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
7.12 The Bank of England raises its base rate by !I, % to 6.25%. 
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